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Unintended population consequences of policies stem from three sources: (1) A
policy overshoots its original goal; (2) different policies conflict, so that the imple-
mentation of one policy inhibits implementation of another policy; (3) negative
consequences of a policy are unforeseen, or are anticipated but judged unlikely to
be severe or considered less important than the positive aims of the policy. Examples
from Singapore, South Africa, Italy, the U.S., and the former Soviet Union are
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
This article discusses three sources of unintended population conse-
quences of policies. First, a policy can be more effective than anticipated
and overshoot its original goal. After that, reversing the earlier trend can be
very difficult. Second, there can be a conflict between different policies.
The implementation of one policy can make it impossible or difficult to
achieve the goals of another policy. Sometimes this inherent conflict is
recognized, but at other times it goes unrecognized for a long time. Third,
there can be unintended negative consequences of a policy, although the
consequences could have been anticipated. Examples of each of these kinds
of unintended consequences are discussed and some overall implications
for policy and demographic change are examined.
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OVERSHOOTING OF GOALS AND INEXACT TARGETING
In the 1960s and 1970s many less-developed countries implemented
policies designed to reduce fertility. It is impossible to overshoot a goal in a
mortality reduction policy, since lower mortality is virtually always consid-
ered desirable, but it can be easy to overshoot a fertility reduction goal, since
the goal is not ever-lower fertility but usually a fertility level that, in com-
bination with mortality, yields a low but positive population growth rate.
When fertility threatens to fall below replacement level, policies are
often implemented to increase fertility. Sometimes the goal is to increase
fertility among all segments of the population, but at times a general pro-
natalist policy is too blunt an instrument. This can happen when the state
wants to encourage childbearing among the highly educated, among
members of a particular ethnic group, or among people in a particular
region of the country. Fine-tuning a pro-natalist policy can be extremely
difficult. This section discusses policies to reduce fertility in Singapore,
followed by policies to increase fertility in Singapore, especially among
ethnic Chinese and among highly educated women.
When a policy overshoots its goals, the result is not completely unin-
tended, since this result was always a possible outcome of the policy. In this
case, the consequences were only unintended in the sense that when the
fertility reduction policies were implemented, the government did not
anticipate needing to implement a pro-natalist policy after only a few years.
Fertility Policies in Singapore Since 1966
Fertility in Singapore began to fall in 1957 (Fawcett & Khoo, 1980,
p. 554). In 1966, Singapore implemented policies intended to lower fertility
further (Cheung, 1998, p. 155). The relative success of the fertility reduction
program in Singapore, in comparison to programs in other countries with
similar goals, has been widely noted (Fawcett & Khoo, 1980; Lee, Alvarez &
Palen, 1991; Saw, 1975). Figure 1 shows the total fertility rate (TFR)1 in
Singapore 1950–2000 (United Nations, 2001).
These policies included a large education campaign, with information
about contraceptives and about the benefits to the family of having no more
than two children. Following Fawcett (1979, pp. 7–9), there were also five
kinds of disincentives to childbearing:
(1) Maternity policies: Fees for pre-natal care and delivery fees increased
with parity, while maternity leave was not given for third and later births.
There was no delivery fee if the woman was sterilized after delivery;
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(2) Education policies: Priority in choice of school is given to first and
second children if a parent was sterilized before age 40 and if no more
than three children were born;
(3) Income tax policies: Income tax deductions are lower or not given for
the third and later children;
(4) Housing policies: Large families no longer have priority in obtaining
larger units in public housing, and those families with no more than
three children are allowed to sublet rooms;
(5) Other policies: Government employees get paid leave after steriliza-
tion, and abortion and sterilization are heavily subsidized (Fawcett,
1979; Fawcett & Khoo, 1980; Lee et al., 1991).
These fertility-reduction policies were successful, but their impact was
differential by ethnic group. Figure 2 shows the total fertility rate 1957–
1996 in Singapore by ethnic group (Cheung, 1998, p. 160). The very rapid
fertility decline, especially among Chinese, is striking. In addition, more-
educated women responded to the incentives to reduce fertility more than
did less-educated women.
In some ways, these policies succeeded too well. By 1980, fertility was
below replacement2 for Singapore as a whole. This low fertility level in
Singapore was due to the low fertility of ethnic Chinese; fertility was above
replacement for the Malay and Indian populations. By 1983, concern about
low fertility generally was growing, but there was concern especially about
the low fertility of university-educated women (Lee et al., 1991, p. 66) and
of ethnic Chinese (Cheung, 1998, p. 158).
FIGURE 1. Total fertility rate in Singapore and Italy 1950–2000.
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In 1984, policies were implemented with the intention of increasing
fertility in specific groups. A program was instituted to give priority access to
high-quality public schools to the children of women who had attended a
university and who had at least three children (Lee et al., 1991, p. 67). Also
in 1984, a governmental Social Development Unit was established to
encourage men and women who were university graduates to marry
(Cheung, 1998, pp. 159–160; Lee et al., 1991, p. 67). The very selective
nature of the program is emphasized by the implementation of a program of
cash payments to poor and poorly-educated women who became sterilized
(Lee et al., 1991, p. 67; Saw, 1985, p. 2).
Now, in 2004, the Singapore government continues to seek ways to
increase population growth. On the website of the Ministry of Community
Development and Sports, of which the Social Development Unit is a part,
there appears the text (Singapore, Ministry of Community Development and
Sports, 2004):
No matter how globalised we become, Singapore needs a core
of Singapore citizens. Do you have any good suggestions on how
we can set up a conducive environment to support parenthood
and ensure a future generation of core Singaporeans? Call us at
1800-2585812 or click on the link above to send in your views.
After a slight increase in the total fertility rate from 1985 to 1995, it
declined to a new low of 1.57 in the 1995–2000 period (Figure 1). The
FIGURE 2. Total fertility rate by ethnic group in Singapore 1957–1996.
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Singapore government found out that fertility was not a faucet that could be
turned on and off.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLICIES
Sometimes the goals of one proposed policy directly conflict with the
goals of another proposed policy. Controversy ensues about which of the
two goals should be pursued. At other times, progress toward the goals of
two policies conflict. Unintended demographic consequences can result
from a policy that was not intended to influence population policies at all
(see also Ting, this issue, and O’Connor, this issue). In this section, examples
of such policy conflicts in the areas of fertility and migration are discussed.
Regionally Differentiated Fertility Policy in the Soviet Union in the
1970s and 1980s
In the late 1970s, the total fertility rate in the Soviet Union was mod-
erate at 2.3. However, this was the result of at or below replacement fertility
in the European part of the Soviet, combined with much higher fertility in
Soviet Central Asia. Figure 3 indicates the difference between fertility in the
European and non-European parts of the Soviet Union by showing the total




fertility rate in the largest European republic, Russia, and in the largest non-
European republic, Uzbekistan (United Nations, 2001).
As a result of the regional fertility differential, there was a developing
labor surplus in Central Asia, and a labor shortage in central European
Russia. There were policies to promote long-term migration from Central
Asia to European Russia, but they met with little success, and there was little
support for moving a large amount of industry from European Russia to
Central Asia.
The Soviet Union had pro-natalist policies in place since 1944, but
these policies did not differentiate by region of the country or rural–urban
residence; further, they came into effect at very high parity, and subsidized
only extremely poor families (Defosses, 1981; Heer, 1977) and, thus, ten-
ded to further increase the regional fertility differential.
Increasingly, some policy-makers and demographers thought that fer-
tility policy should be differentiated by region or by rural–urban residence,
and many thought that fertility incentives should be developed to encour-
aged women to have a moderate (not low) level of fertility, rather than only
rewarding a high level of fertility (Jones & Grupp, 1987; Weber & Good-
man, 1981).
While many demographers from Russia advocated a differentiated
policy in order to approach equalization of fertility levels in different parts
of the Soviet Union and to encourage women who were having two chil-
dren to have three children, other demographers, especially those from
Central Asia, criticized such regional proposals as discriminatory and
implicitly genocidal (Heer, 1977; Jones & Grupp, 1987; Weber & Good-
man, 1981). Basic principles were in conflict.
At the Soviet Communist Party Congress in 1981, a limited fertility
policy was implemented that encouraged second and third births. This
policy took effect throughout the Soviet Union by 1983. The policy pro-
vided a payment of 50 rubles for second and third births, paid maternity
leave of one year (eventually extended to three years), and defined a family
with three children or more as a ‘‘large family,’’ which allowed them pri-
ority in housing and other services (Weber & Goodman, 1981; Zakharov &
Ivanova, 1996).
Probably as a result of these new pro-natalist policies, fertility in the
European part of the Soviet Union increased for a while, with the TFR in
Russia rising from 2.03 in 1980–1985 to 2.13 in 1985–1990, and then
falling to 1.52 in 1990–1995. Zakharov and Ivanova (1996) argue, however,
that the rise in fertility in Russia would have been temporary even if the
Soviet Union had not dissolved, since the policies to promote second and
third births mainly affected the timing of these births rather than resulting in
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a larger desired family size. It is unknown whether these policies to promote
moderate rather than low fertility would have had a greater effect if they had
been introduced earlier.
Fertility, Labor Force Participation and Childcare in Italy
Many European countries have below-replacement fertility and would
like to increase childbearing (Chesnais, 1996). Also, in some countries
many people, including members of the government, think that it is best for
mothers of young children to stay home to care for their children.
These two aims can conflict. If women need to make a choice between
having a child and working for pay, this can result in both lower female
labor force participation and lower fertility than if women thought they
could successfully pursue both roles. Many of these same low-fertility
countries have aging populations and would like to raise female labor force
participation because they face an increasing old age dependency ratio.
Policies that discourage both childbearing and female labor force partici-
pation present a severe problem for these countries.
For individual women in a given society there is often a negative
relation between childbearing and labor force participation, because of the
competing role demands women face as mother and worker (Bernhardt,
1993, pp. 27–28). However, Sundstrom and Stafford (1991) found a strong
positive relationship between the total fertility rate and the female labor
force participation rate in 20 developed countries. Rindfuss and Brewster
(1996) argue that the essential issue in developed countries is role incom-
patibility: that if women can successfully combine the roles of mother and
worker, then both fertility and female labor force participation will be rel-
atively high. Thus, within any given country, the less conflict between the
demands of the roles of mother and worker, the higher both fertility and
female labor force participation. Consistent with this view, Apps and Rees
(2001, p. 1) find that countries that ‘‘support families through improved
availability of alternatives to domestic childcare, rather than through direct
child payments, are likely to have both higher female labor supply and
higher fertility.’’
Italy is perhaps an extreme example of the policy and value conflict
described above. With below-replacement fertility since the mid-1970s, the
Italian government has sought to increase fertility. Figure 1 shows the total
fertility rate in Italy 1950–2000. The decline in fertility has been gradual but
sustained since the mid-1960s.
Among six Western European countries (Austria, U.K., Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands and West Germany) in 1988, Italian respondents express the
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strongest support for the centrality of children (Jones & Brayfield, 1997). In a
study of 34 industrialized countries, Treas and Widmer (2000) found the
largest gender difference in attitudes about the appropriateness of women
combining work and motherhood in Italy, with Italian men being much
more conservative.
Private childcare in Italy is rare, and there are limited public childcare
spaces available for children under age 3, meaning that Italian families
cannot rely on being able to obtain a space in public childcare for a young
child. In addition, public childcare is open at most 7.5 hours per day. The
limited public childcare hours are also a problem because in most of Italy,
there is little part-time work available for women (Del Boca, Locatelli &
Vuri, 2003).
The inconvenience and lack of availability of childcare in Italy make
the combination of having a small child and working full-time especially
difficult for women. Traditionally, in Italy, it was acceptable for a close
relative, such as the child’s grandmother, to care for a small child. From a
study in 1998, 72.9% of working mothers with a child under age 3 used
informal childcare, such as a relative (Del Boca, et al., 2003). However,
increased geographic mobility means that the proportion of Italian working-
age families who live close to the older generation has declined. Del Boca
(2002) found that the availability of public childcare, and the availability of
a relative who could care for a young child, were more important in
women’s decisions to work for pay than was the cost of childcare. The cost
of childcare was only important in those locations in which there was not a
shortage of public childcare spaces.
In an analysis of the relation of fertility and female labor force partic-
ipation in Italy, using panel data on married women for 1991–1995, Del
Boca (2002) found that availability of childcare and availability of part-time
work were related to both the probability that a woman would work for pay
and the probability that the woman would have a child. It seems that in Italy
attitudes and policies that encourage women to stay home to care for their
young children have contributed to depressing both fertility and female
labor force participation below the levels they likely would have attained if
childcare had been available in a way that was more compatible with the
needs of mother who work for pay.
Brain Drain in South Africa
There has been much concern in South Africa about net emigration
from the country, especially among skilled professionals, such as medical
doctors. At the same time, the South African public expresses strong
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antagonism toward immigrants (Southern African Migration Project, 2001c).
This anti-immigrant sentiment is often encouraged by the South African
press (South African Migration Project, 2000a).
Figure 4 shows legal immigration, emigration and net migration rates
to South Africa 1950–1999 (South African Institute of Race Relations, 2001,
pp. 66–67). The image of the brain drain in South Africa is of skilled workers
fleeing the country. However, the shift from net immigration to net emi-
gration is mainly due to the decline in the immigration rate; the emigration
rate changed more slowly than the immigration rate.
South Africa has the best economy in Africa and would be an attractive
destination for professionals in other African countries. There have been
concerns in other parts of Africa about a possible ‘‘brain drain’’ of skilled
workers and professionals to South Africa (Saasa, 1996; Southern African
Migration Project, 2002, p. 3). However, motivated by the desire to protect
good jobs in South Africa for South Africans, it is extremely difficult for a
non-South African to get a work permit or obtain permanent residency.
These barriers to immigration or work by foreigners have prevented any
substantial brain drain from the rest of Africa to South Africa from occurring
(Crush, 1999; Southern African Migration Project, 2000b).
South Africa passed new immigration legislation in 2002 (South Africa,
2002), which acknowledges that border control cannot totally stop illegal
migration to South Africa. The law depends mainly on rules requiring
employers to determine that all of their employees have proper documen-
FIGURE 4. Immigration, emigration and net immigration rates per 1000
population, South Africa legal migrants 1950–1999.
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tation to work in South Africa. This approach concentrates on regulating
who takes good jobs (jobs with an employer who pays wages); it is less
concerned with illegal migrants who work on their own account, such as in
trade.
In discussion of the planned legislation, it was clear that a top priority
was protecting South African jobs for South Africans. As in other countries,
for skilled jobs, the White Paper on Migration stated that if there is a
shortage of qualified South Africans, the first preference goes to persons
from other Southern African countries, then to persons from elsewhere in
Africa, then to persons from the rest of the world (South Africa, Department
of Home Affairs, 1999). However, the 2002 Immigration Act does not
incorporate these preferences (Southern African Migration Project, 2001a,
2001b).
Thus, through a combination of policies, South Africa seems to be
choosing to accept a brain drain of skilled workers in order to achieve the
goal of protecting good jobs in South Africa for South Africans.
ANTICIPATED BUT UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Sometimes negative population consequences of a policy are foreseen
as possible but either the positive policy aims are viewed as having priority,
or there is disagreement about the extent to which possible negative con-
sequences will occur. In this section, some negative consequences of
immigration law and immigration enforcement policy in the U. S. are dis-
cussed.
Immigration Law and Enforcement in the United States Since 1986
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 placed responsibility
on employers not to employ workers who did not have legal status in the
U.S. The U.S. Congress anticipated that discrimination against applicants
who appeared foreign would likely increase. Analysis of data from a Gov-
ernment Accounting Office survey of employers found that 10% of
employers changed the way they treated applicants who appeared foreign
(Lowell, Teachman & Jing, 1995; U.S. Government Accounting Office,
1990). Lowell et al., (1995) further found that those employers who chan-
ged their practices also tended to hire a disproportionately small number of
Hispanics, suggesting that discrimination had increased against Hispanics
who could legally work in the U.S.
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In 1993, the U.S. Government substantially increased its efforts to
reduce illegal migration from Mexico, especially in areas that had been
heavily used for this purpose. Between 1994 and 2000, Border Patrol
apprehensions on the Southwest order increased by 68%, followed by a
decline in 2001 of 25% (Cornelius, 2001).
Cornelius (2001) argues that some of the major effects of the new
policies were that illegal migrants who had already entered the U.S. tended
to stay longer (due to the increased danger of apprehension while crossing);
and new migrants redirected their border crossing choices to previously
less-used border areas. But these new areas were in difficult terrain, which
posed substantial risks to the migrants. Between 1996 and 2000 deaths of
illegal border-crossers in the southwest increased by 474%, from 87 in 1996
to 499 in 2000. The increased deaths were mainly from drowning and heat-
related causes, such as dehydration and sunstroke.
In both of these areas related to illegal migration, the main conse-
quences were foreseen. Congress in considering IRCA recognized that
increased discrimination against Hispanics, whether in the United States
legally or not, would increase. Regarding the stricter enforcement proce-
dures at the border, Cornelius (2001, p. 667) writes:
In addition to rechanneling the flow of illegal migrants, the
current US border enforcement strategy has significantly raised
the cost and physical risks associated with illegal entry. These
should not be treated as ‘‘unintended’’ consequences, since they
were a integral part of the INS’s ‘‘prevention through deter-
rence’’ strategy from its inception.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have discussed examples of different ways in which unintended
demographic consequences of policy occur. The three types of unintended
consequences proceed from least unintended to most unintended. Even in
the examples discussed there is some overlap of types.
Table 1 lists the examples discussed and classifies them by type. If
‘‘unintended’’ means completely unanticipated, few policy consequences
are actually unintended. Often unintended population consequences are
viewed as negative. To avoid these negative consequences, it is not




In democracies the determination of government policy is a major
focus of disagreement among political parties. It is not surprising that
different policies are often in conflict, or that there are disagreements
about how severe anticipated negative consequences of policies might
be. Even in non-democratic states, such as the former Soviet Union, the
different positions of various groups in society had some influence on
policy (Skilling & Griffiths, 1971).
Research and analysis can provide better understanding of likely
intended and unintended policy consequences, which can help both pol-
icy-makers and the public. However, as long as policy-makers do not agree
on what policies are desired, and so long as there is little incentive to not
implement policies that conflict with each other, the kinds of unintended
population consequences of policy discussed in this article are likely to
continue to occur.
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1. The total fertility rate at a given date is the number of children that a woman would have if
she lived through the childbearing ages having children at each age at the rate in force in
that population at that date.
2. Replacement level fertility is the level of fertility, which in combination with age-specific
mortality rates would lead to zero population growth in the long term. This means that the
net reproduction rate would equal 1.00. In a low mortality population, this means a total
fertility rate of slightly higher than 2.00.
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